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Responding to concerns about burden-sharing and aiming to improve internal defence cooperation, act 
more quickly and harness resource synergies, the European Union (EU) initiated the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017. PESCO, however, is controversial. On the one hand, the United 
States (US) wants greater burden-sharing by European allies whilst concerned about greater European 
military autarky that would undermine US influence over NATO, Europe/EU and EU member states. On 
the other hand, at least one European NATO ally wants to leverage PESCO precisely as an instrument to 
shore up European “strategic autonomy”. This tension over competing European defence futures leaves 
participation by third countries in limbo. Arguably, third-country participation would hinder greater 
European defence autarky. The article makes the case for the mutual benefits of third-country 
participation, focusing on Canada. Canada has a major stake in the outcome. NATO is Canada’s most 
important multilateral institution and Europe is Canada’s second-most important strategic partner, 
after the US. Canada’s unequivocal strategic interests in Europe have long informed its expeditionary 
priorities -- from the two world wars, when Canada coming to Europe’s defence long before the US 
proved existential for both parties, to nowadays. Since the 1970s, Canada and Europe have worked 
consistently together bilaterally beyond NATO to advance regional stability and mutual security 
interests. Canada’s and Europe’s defence futures are thus interdependent. Excluding third countries from 
participating in PESCO would have detrimental consequences for Canadian, European and transatlantic 
defence interests. In contrast, with third country participation, PESCO will be instrumental to effective 
transatlantic and transeuropean defence integration.  
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Introduction 
National security and defence are among the most fiercely guarded areas of national 
jurisdiction, in part because they protect the state from existential threats, and in part 
because a series of ancillary benefits accrue to the state, such as innovation, economic 
growth, jobs, and so forth. As a result, collaboration, coordination and cooperation in 
defence can prove difficult and needs to be incentivized. This is in keeping with balance 
of threat theory and the economic theory of alliances, which explain why smaller states 
generally ally with a larger power: for protection and to free-ride on security guarantees 




European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the 
inception of the Alliance 70 years ago with special focus allocated to issues like military 
mobility (Tardy, 2018, p. 3). So, many Europeans were bewildered when, in May 2019, 
the US Pentagon formally expressed its disapproval of the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) in a pejorative letter 
addressed to the EU’s then foreign-policy chief, Federica Mogherini. The letter expressed 
concerns that these functional arrangements would “produce duplication, non-
interoperable military systems, diversion of scarce defence resources and unnecessary 
competition between NATO and the EU” (Brzozowski, 2019, online). This apparent 
contradiction – between the major power’s concerns about levels of cooperation and 
competition on the one hand, and strategic use of defence resources on the other – is 
telling and instructive. The US has a balance to strike: between an enduring interest in 
having allies shoulder more of the burden, but without inadvertently engendering 
greater allied military autarky that might compromise US influence over its allies. 
The EU forged its Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP) in 2003 in the wake of 
the Lisbon Treaty, which spawned a series of external strategic partnerships with non-
EU member countries. In 2017, the EU announced PESCO as a means to improve 
internal defence cooperation, act more quickly, and synergistically leverage EU resources 
among 25 of 28 EU member states (Biscop, 2012, p. 1305): the UK, Denmark and Malta 
opted out of this trans-European arrangement. PESCO is complemented by the EDF 
whose strategic aim is to provide funding to encourage medium and smaller member 
states to play along with PESCO (Biscop, 2012, p. 1305). The Trump administration’s 
aforementioned reaction to PESCO illustrates the limits of burden-sharing within the 
NATO alliance: while it is to the US’s benefit for European allies improve their 
cooperation, it is not in the US interest for Europe to become an autarkic military actor 
as that would compromise US influence over NATO as well as European military affairs. 
This article takes up this controversy in the context of third-country participation in 
PESCO, using Canada as a critical case study. 
First, the article briefly explains PESCO and EDF, and situates them in the context of the 
CDSP, transatlantic and trans-European relations. Then the article situates the EDF and 
PESCO more specifically in the context of Canada-EU relations in general, and the 
Canada-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement more specifically. Finally, the article 
explains the prospective participation of third parties in both the EDF and PESCO from 
the perspective of Canadian grand strategy, bilateral relations between Canada and 
select EU member countries, and EU grand strategy. The article concludes by 
considering Canadian participation in PESCO and EDF in the context of decades of 
existential ties between Canada and Europe. The nexus of that transatlantic and trans-
European defence relationship transcends mere transactional and instrumental relations 
of mutual benefit and is instead at the very crux of shared grand strategic objectives that 
are shaped by mutual co-dependence on the US security umbrella and extended nuclear 
deterrence. 
Context 
The strategic uncertainty sown by the Trump administration about America’s enduring 
commitment to the defence of common regional and international interests has been 
galvanizing closer synergies among non-US allies (Leuprecht et al., 2019, p. 164). The 
election of Donald Trump as the ‘Disruptor in Chief’ is symptomatic of the US stepping 
back from global defence initiatives (Allison 2018, p. 132). Although he would be loath to 
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admit it, Trump’s approach is actually marked by considerable continuity with Obama-
era initiatives in which the US has maintained a consistent policy of “pragmatic realism”, 
where the US chooses to respond to global crises as a function of domestic factors 
(Dombrowski Reich, 2018, p. 57). The ‘silver lining’ here is how waning trust in the US’s 
commitment is emancipating domestic and trans-European self-consciousness and 
autonomy in doubling down on multilateral relations (Dombrowski Reich, 2018, p. 57). 
In response, the trans-European relationship is morphing: from a bilateral hub-and-
spoke model centred on Washington, DC, to a denser multiplayer network. The 
emergent fusion of transatlantic and trans-European relations has been accelerated by 
the Trump administration’s pursuit of accommodating immediate, narrow existential US 
interests, even if it comes at the expense of allies, such as confrontation with the EU over 
tariffs and barriers. The priority the US accords to Chinese and Russian threats above 
European defence contributes further to divergence from EU member states (Colby and 
Mitchell, 2020, pp. 118-130). 
Member states of NATO, individually and collectively, are finding their foreign, security 
and defence policy increasingly decoupled from that of the US for the first time since the 
end of WWII and the rise of the US from a regional power to the preeminent superpower 
over the course of the 20th century. Tranatlanticism had always been as much about 
extended US deterrence – the “Empire by invitation” (Lundestad, 1986, pp. 263-277) – 
as about the claim to superpower status: in modern times, that status has inextricably 
been linked to the power that is able to dominate Europe. At the same time, the 
emergent multiplayer network structure among US allies suggests that the relationship 
among the non-US members of the Alliance, among Canada and the EU, and between 
Canada and select EU member states, is actually becoming more resilient. 
PESCO exemplifies that emergent multiplayer network: it is the first binding security 
commitment within the EU, including 25 EU self-enlisted member states (Biscop, 2012, 
p. 1306). PESCO is less clear-cut than the EDF but has the potential to use resources 
more effectively (European Commission, 2019). Whereas PESCO is funded by states and 
supported by pre-existing institutions, the EDF has dedicated funding diverted from 
other EU projects. Where the EDF fosters research and innovation, PESCO is 
operational in nature. PESCO focuses on the development of shared defence capabilities 
with projects such as military, cyber and disaster relief. As of November 2019, PESCO 
had 47 projects across seven categories: Training, Facilities; Land, Formations Systems; 
Maritime; Air, Systems; Cyber C4ISR; Enabling, Joint; and Space (cf. Appendices A and 
B). Within each category multiple projects are in progress with member states choosing 
to participate in initiatives based on factors such as the availability of armed forces, 
capabilities, and national defence priorities. However, third-country participation is an 
issue yet to be resolved. 
The European Defence Agency (EDA) offers a model for third-country participation. For 
PESCO, however, that model is suboptimal. The EDA and EDF are already open to third-
country engagement on an exceptional basis, provided involvement falls within a 
procurement or contractual framework. However, this necessarily precludes ongoing 
contracts and the long-term and stable involvement of third-country participation 
(European Parliament, 2019). By contrast, PESCO opens the opportunity to harness 
defence synergies more effectively and precisely by capitalizing on EU resources, 
collaborating with NATO, and enabling member-state capabilities to be shared. The 
scale of PESCO’s influence thus makes it a key player in defence relationships both 




PESCO, then, is not just a mere instrument to improve cooperation, but also holds out 
the promise of a new dawn in transatlantic and trans-European relations. That dawn 
harbours significant opportunity for improved burden-sharing; but it also harbours 
considerable risk. On the one hand, PESCO could eventually pave the way for the EU to 
mature into an autarkic military actor that could go it alone in defence rather than with 
other allies, such as Canada or the U.S. On the other hand, PESCO may end up 
alienating the US from the EU and NATO, rather than generating synergies, efficiencies 
and effectiveness that enhance collective burden-sharing. There is clear potential for the 
EDF and PESCO to divide burden sharing, provide effective and widespread defence 
against cyber-threats, and facilitate more specific communication between EU and 
NATO institutions (Lété, 2019, p. 39). Views on the competing aims of PESCO differ 
among EU member states: as an enabler of trans-European synergies within the 
transatlantic relationship – or outside it. The difference in views is a function of 
competing conceptions of “strategic autonomy,” as French president Emmanuel Macron 
likes to call it: dealignment or realignment – the EU as a more autonomous actor beyond 
transatlantic relations, or PESCO as a means of bolstering the EU as a strategic actor 
within the transatlantic and trans-European framework (The Economist, 2019). That 
divergence necessarily makes the quality and quantity of third-country participation 
controversial. 
Defence cooperation 
The CDSP is agnostic on this matter. Its aim is closer defence cooperation among and 
within the EU. For instance, research, development, innovation and procurement are 
notoriously complex and expensive; so, cooperation holds out the promise of 
disproportionate economies of scale (European Defense Agency, 2019). That is especially 
tempting in times when threat vectors are multiplying, the regional and international 
security environment is becoming more complex, and budgets are restrained. At the 
same time, there is little appetite for a European army on a state or institutional level – 
especially among countries within the EU (Mérand, 2008). From the perspective of 
Canada, the EU’s strategic partnership countries and the vast majority of EU member 
states these are distinct problems, generating greater operational synergies as opposed 
to working towards a European army. France, by contrast, has long held a very different 
view that privileges bilateral agreements with the UK over multilateral relationships with 
the EU and North America (Biscop, 2012, p. 1306). Bilateral agreements provide for 
benefits to be distributed evenly between the states in question. Given concerns over 
‘band wagoning’ within the EU combined with Brexit negotiations such bilateral 
agreements will likely become more fashionable. The trend towards bilateralism between 
European states is exacerbated by the US taking a step back from NATO. With the 
advent of the Trump administration, Europe has taken on a greater leadership role 
among the other great powers (Allison, 2018, p. 130). To compensate for diminished 
credibility, the loss of the UK, and the decreasing American security presence in the 
region, the EU has rallied around facilitating “strategic autonomy” in defense (Tardy, 
2018, p. 2). The focus on “strategic autonomy” has provided a shared goal among EU 
members and has worked to foster an institutionalized commitment to defence 
innovation and industry apart from the US influence (Sokolsky 2019, p. 7). 
To this end, PESCO aims to enhance European defence cooperation in a way that past 
frameworks such as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) could not (Biscop, 2012, p. 1305). Furthermore, it 
builds on the efforts that these initiatives took in facilitating EU autonomy from NATO 
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as such a desire emerged in part due to NATO’s handling of the various Yugoslav 
conflicts (Tardy, 2018, p. 1). A closer look reveals that PESCO generates different 
benefits and complications than past agreements that have aimed to strengthen 
European defence. First, participation in PESCO is voluntary for EU members, which is 
meant to avoid commitment problems. Second, the minimal pool of resources available 
to this voluntary arrangement means that PESCO is set up in a top down fashion that 
leverages existing EU institutions. Although states do not have to commit their own 
resources and funding, it is not without pitfalls (Biscop, 2012, p. 1305). Finally, all 
PESCO agreements that states choose to enter into are legally binding. All 25 members 
are required to submit a National Implementation Plan (NIP) outlining annual progress 
to ensure that they are upholding PESCO agreements (European Union, 2019). 
The EDF, meanwhile, is a comprehensive defence fund that signals a shift in EU 
priorities, putting defence at the forefront. The Commission is aiming to use the EDF as 
a fully-fledged innovative defence base with the capability to expand the EU’s “strategic 
autonomy” (European Union, 2019). To this end, the Commission has committed a 
modest 13 billion EUR between 2021 and 2027 – about what Portugal spends annually 
on defence (European Defence Agency, 2019). Member states can increase value by 
adding to this baseline funding. The specific focus of this investment is research and 
creation of innovative technology and equipment (European Defence Agency, 2019).  
PESCO is meant to facilitate an open-ended form of defence cooperation. Current 
PESCO initiatives include a cyber response team and possess a specific focus on software 
(cf. Appendices A & B); but the bulk of Projects have thus far been about increasing 
military mobility throughout Europe, especially in collaboration with NATO (Fiott, 2018, 
p. 314). PESCO’s most recent batch of 13 projects are more specific than previously 
developed initiatives, focusing heavily on innovation and training (cf. Appendix B). Yet, 
none of these projects involve countries from continents other than Europe (Council of 
the European Union, 2019). At present, France is concerned that an inclusive PESCO 
will aggravate collective action problems and thus weaken cooperation, a concern to 
which Greece, Spain and Germany in particular are sympathetic (Maulny and Di 
Bernardini 2019, p. 10). Some would like to see case-by-case criteria that can guarantee 
the support of states with expertise and exclude others that have little value to add 
(Maulny and Di Bernardini 2019, p. 10). This has a direct bearing on Canada given the 
significant value-added it has been providing as an eFP Framework nation to Latvian, 
Baltic and Nordic deterrence. As such, including Canada in PESCO is a ready way for 
Europe to keep Canada engaged. The main concern about including third-party states is 
that they may degrade the ability of the EU to make strategic decisions. However, this is 
hardly a concern with respect to Canada – its interests have long aligned tightly with 
those of the EU and its member states. 
Canada and Europe 
Canada and the EU share goals of combatting terrorism through shared links, promoting 
international law, sustainable development of shared policies, all with a specific 
comment to the importance of multilateral organizations in advancing cooperation and 
addressing challenges (Brunet-Jailly et al. 2018, p. 360). They have a joint interest in 
international peace and security such as control of weapons of mass destruction, 
monitoring of circulation of small arms, participation in the international criminal court, 
combat of terrorism, support to international peace and stability, and cooperation 




are committed to improving the effectiveness of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), NATO and Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Government of Canada, 2016). Specifically, article 15 the 
Canada-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement addresses knowledge-sharing through 
innovation and technology (Government of Canada, 2018). The Agreement comes on the 
heels of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Canada already 
participates in a plethora of EU ventures, from the European Space Agency to the 
European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Over the years, Canada 
has worked closely with Europe on development policy (Rath, 2004, p. 859) and 
contributed to a host of reconstruction, stabilization, rule-of-law and policing missions 
run by the EU. 
The Strategic Partnership Agreement upgrades current cooperation between Canada and 
the EU, specifically regarding trade and investment, and furthers a shared focus on 
security. Many Canada-EU bilateral discussions involve PESCO content such as cyber 
and military response (European Defence Agency, 2019). At the same time, Canada has a 
track-record of agreements with the European Defence Agency (EDA), notably through 
NATO arrangements (European Defence Agency and NATO, 2015). 
But common ties and commitment run much deeper. No non-European country carried 
a heavier death toll on the European battlefields of the two world wars than Canada. It 
was Canada’s early commitment to WWII that helped the UK fend off German invasion. 
It also allowed the US to use the UK as an eventual staging theatre for the subsequent 
allied invasion of the continent. Canada had an extensive commitment to Europe during 
the Cold War in the form of its deployment to Germany. It made a significant 
contribution to stabilizing the Balkans. And, as of late, Canada has had a significant 
military footprint in the Middle East and North Africa. This is in part because regional 
stability is in Canada’s interest as conflagration in the Middle East had destabilizing 
effects on European domestic politics.1 
For over a century Canada has been resolute in its commitment to European peace and 
security on the one hand, and to the transatlantic alliance on the other hand – through 
NATO, as well as through the EU. For Canada, NATO has been first and foremost about 
security, particularly European security. Irrespective of the government of the day, 
Canada is a “closest realist”. It participates in European missile defence (while having 
stayed out of Ballistic Missile Defence of the North American continent) and made a 
Framework Nation commitment to Latvia as part of the enhanced Forward Presence 
(eFP) along the North-Eastern flank. An unwavering commitment to peace and stability 
in Europe is integral to Canadian grand strategy for reasons of national as well as 
collective interest. 
Canada saw it as vital to its interests to prevent any single power from dominating 
Europe – first Germany, against which Canada went to war twice, and then the Soviet 
Union. As one harsh critic of Canadian engagement in NATO once put it, “In many ways 
Canada’s role in NATO was a form of atonement for our lack of broad foreign policy 
objectives after the First World War” (Hertzman et al., 1969, p. 15). Having tried to 
retreat into a state of isolationism after 1918 only to be dragged back into another 
European war in 1939, Canadians said in 1949 “never again”. That is why they were 
prepared to join in, to contain the Soviet threat before it got out of hand. During the 
                                                        
1 Discussion about Canada’s help to Ukraine in Bendiek and Schenuit (2019, in this Special Issue). 
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negotiations that led to the North Atlantic Treaty, one articulate Canadian diplomat 
noted,  
[t]his link across the North Atlantic seems to me to be such a providential solution 
to so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great length and even incur 
considerable risk in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper 
place in this new partnership (Reid 1977, p. 312) 
Canada can do so because it has capacity. Canada fields the eighth-largest military in 
NATO. Canada ranks among the top 20 militaries in the world (Leuprecht et al., 2019, p. 
120). Although within NATO, Canada ranks in the bottom third on military spending as 
a percentage of GDP, Canada consistently ranks around 15th in the world in in total 
military expenditure (Tian et al., 2019). This is reflected in Canada’s 2019 defence 
expenditure, totalling at 28 810 million Canadian dollars, or 21 885 US dollars (Ozawa, 
2019, pp. 142-143). In NATO, only the US, the UK, France, Germany and Italy spend 
more on defence. These countries are all more populous and with larger economies than 
Canada. On a per capita basis, only the US, Norway, the UK, Denmark, Netherlands, 
France, Germany and Greece spend more than Canada (Leuprecht et al., 2019, p. 120). 
Canada has, on occasion, been criticized for spending too little on defence. However, 
these figures and Canada’s contribution to the enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia 
show such criticism to be misleading. In fact, Canada is one of only five NATO member 
countries that maintains a full-spectrum military, it is among half a dozen NATO 
member countries that can field experienced and trusted headquarters capacity, and has 
a proven track-record to deploy that capacity in support of collective defence, regional 
stability and international security (NATO, 2017). The capacity that Canada offers is 
popular, robust, competent and well-equipped. Defence is ultimately about balancing 
cost, capability and commitment. Canada’s ‘mantra’ has always been not to focus not on 
expenditure but on capability and commitment instead, since Canada consistently 
outperforms on both (Leuprecht et al., 2019, p. 121). 
And yet, as discussed in the larger public policy context, governments cannot easily 
escape the dilemmas, problems and paradoxes of defence spending, especially for 
unanticipated foreign deployments (Leuprecht et al., 2019, p. 121). On the one hand, 
funds spent on defence are then not available to enhance economic prosperity and social 
well-being. In domestic politics, there is little electoral payoff to spending on defence 
relative to the disproportionate payoff for spending on economic growth and social 
programs. That explains why as a percentage of GDP and overall government 
expenditure, democracies spend not just very little on defence, by and large, they 
actually spend (significantly) less on defence than other types of regimes (Leuprecht et 
al., 2019, p. 122).  
On the other hand, NATO collectively accounts for about three quarters of global defence 
spending (Leuprecht et al., 2019, p. 122). Ergo, democracy needs to be defended; but 
because democracies tend to be disproportionately prosperous, they can afford to 
outspend other regimes on defence without breaking the bank. In fact, military spending 
among democracies is not just instrumental. It is existential to counter a host of risks, 
the greatest being internal derision, not external aggression. 
The risk of greater US unilateralism has loomed since the inception of the Alliance, 
reflecting US policies of defence prior to WWII (McDougall 1997, p. 139). The current 




fewer US troops stationed abroad and a greater emphasis on favoured regional powers to 
check the hostile ones. This is problematic for those countries that rely on NATO for 
collective defence and may lose out in innovation and security if they take a step back. As 
such, Canada has an interest in keeping the US engaged, as do all other NATO member 
countries (Haglund 1990, p. 84). But only a handful of members have capacities 
analogous to the ones Canada can bring to bear. As such, Canada may not be 
conspicuous by its presence in PESCO and the EDF, but Canada’s absence would 
certainly be noticed. Canada’s firm commitment further entices the US to stay engaged 
with Europe and in the region at a time when the US appears to be reneging on its 
European commitments (Elbridge and Mitchell, 2020). The US is more likely to remain 
committed to Europe when the burden is shared equitably among allies.  
The eFP and PESCO enhance burden-sharing by harnessing synergies and economies of 
scale. Like all countries, the US pursues its self-interest and has always done so. It has 
always been “America First.” The US is so powerful in relative terms that it can afford to 
make unilateral decisions whilst most allies cannot. Multilateralism becomes a ‘default’ 
option for the other allies. By way of example, Canada would never go to war or deploy 
on its own. It deploys always in coordination with allies, the US first and foremost 
among them. The US’s clout means that decisions made in Washington reverberate 
strongly with allies. Commitments to collective defence, such as PESCO, are thus also a 
way for allies (such as Canada) to check the US’s unilateralist inclinations. In contrast to 
the US’s hegemony over defence innovation and procurement, PESCO encourages 
collaboration and cooperation on the one hand, and a balance against the US’s 
hegemony mentioned above on the other. 
Indeed, the other institutionalist rationale for NATO has long been to solve commitment 
problems in the form of easy-riding (not free-riding) (Leuprecht and Sokolsky, 2015, p. 
544) among member countries tempted to under-spend on defence and contain the 
temptation of over-reliance on the US security umbrella. The US has long encouraged 
European states to strengthen regional defence with the intent of reducing US spending 
in the area. EU defence has responded with a vigour, to the point where it risks 
weakening NATO resources rather than reduce them as intended. A trajectory towards 
greater self-sufficiency offers European countries that remain vested in US defence, such 
as Germany, with the opportunity to become better equipped to act unilaterally 
(Sokolsky, 2019, p. 7). PESCO and the EDF will perform an analogous function – provide 
an incentive for countries to continue to spend on defence and hedge against 
commitment problems. The risk of subsequent defection is real. During the initial years 
of the new millennium, European NATO allies reduced their defence budget by some 50 
billion Euros collectively. US concerns extend beyond transatlantic countries outside of 
the EU. These countries benefit from a stronger and more independent Europe yet lose 
out from a reduced US defence presence. Confronted with the threat of Russian 
revisionism, trans-European synergies that optimize defence coordination bolster the 
sort of united front that serves both US and allied interests in the region (Elbridge and 
Mitchell, 2020). 
Canada cares about Europe and its flanks for at least three strategic reasons. First, 
Canada’s prosperity hinges directly on trade, and notably its ability to export natural 
resources across the world. As Canada develops an increasingly close trade relationship 
with the EU through agreements such as CETA, threats to resource consumption may 
depress trade demands. This may counter Canadian strategic interests of expanding 
trade with Europe.  
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Second, aside from Canada’s bilateral relationships with the US and its transatlantic 
NATO partners, Europe is Canada’s most important multilateral partner. For strategic 
reasons, then, Canada is intent on a stable, united, prosperous, harmonious and 
powerful Europe in general, and the EU in particular. The EU and its member countries 
are increasingly called upon to solve crises, both within NATO and without. That makes 
the EU an emergent superpower. Any threat that compromises the sovereignty of any 
European or EU member state arguably presents a direct threat to Canadian interests. 
Strategically, then, in the short- and medium-term, it is much more efficient and 
effective for Canada to incur the financial and political costs of a modest contribution to 
PESCO to ensure it is a viable initiative that generates collective defence payoffs. The 
costs and consequences of local and regional instability would be much higher. Thus, 
support of European defence by third parties has some potential to reinforce European 
unity. 
Third, since the Ogdensburg Declaration of 1938 and the Kingston Dispensation of 1940, 
the US and Canada have pursued a continental grand strategy with an objective to keep 
security threats and instability away from North American shores (Leuprecht et al., 
2019, p. 121). That explains why the strategic culture of the US and Canada is inherently 
expeditionary. Canada’s grand strategy is premised on two seemingly contradictory 
dimensions of its strategic culture. The first is that Canada has historically embraced an 
expeditionary approach when it comes to defence policy and the posture and 
deployment of Canadian military power. “From Paardeberg to Panjwai,” as eminent 
historians Bercuson and Granatstein (2012, p. 193) have written, “Canadian 
governments [...] have believed that one of the key missions of the Canadian military is 
to deploy abroad.” These deployments have served the national interest. In imperial 
wars, world wars, the Cold War and myriad limited conflicts that have characterized the 
post–Cold War and post 9/11 period, Canada has contributed extremely useful and 
highly regarded forces. It is up to the efforts of allies to contain global threats and lesser 
challenges posed by regional instability to the security and stability of the West and, 
therefore, to Canada. In addition to meeting a common threat, forces have been 
dispatched overseas to send a message and, by so doing, to guarantee Ottawa “a seat at 
the table” along with a sense of status and prestige (Leuprecht et al., 2019, p. 125). This 
expeditionary strategic culture allowed Canada – which neither was regarded, nor saw 
itself as a great power – to nonetheless, show larger nations (e.g. the UK and the US), 
international organizations (such as the UN) or allied nations (including the ones across 
Europe) that Canada is ready and able to step up when military forces are needed to 
defend allies, deter aggression, and keep or enforce peace. Doing so has won Canada 
diplomatic recognition, political acceptance, entrée into arrangements, treaties, and 
alliances that are important to Canada and Canadians – such as the EDF and PESCO – 
and have a voice on how future international policies will be pursued. Were Canada not 
to take part in such missions abroad, friends and enemies alike would have concluded 
long ago that Canada is of no consequence, does not deserve to be listened to and ought 
not to be accorded any favours in bilateral or multilateral negotiations over matters of 
consequence. This approach to the allied commitments guarantees that Canada “will 
always prefer to undertake less of an effort than its great-power partners want it to, but 
not so little as to be eliminated altogether from their strategic decision making” 
(Haglund and Roussel, 2007, p. 11). 
As Europe faces a revived Russian threat, particularly to the “new” allies on its eastern 
frontier, PESCO has taken on a sense of urgency in the collective defence of the EU’s 




military uncertainty and complications that will challenge the management and unity of 
the Union, demanding adjustments and compromises. 
European democracies have consistently adopted strategic initiatives, with many focused 
on military contributions. These contributions are important and required from each 
member of the EU, their relative size notwithstanding. The EU’s engagement with 
military policy has provided Canada with a security community to which Canada has 
consistently applied itself to and contributed to in times of need (Leuprecht and 
Sokolsky, 2019, p. 127). 
Nowadays, we are witnessing a resurgent Canadian commitment to Europe, with Canada 
once again dispatching forces, lending its albeit modest – yet not inconsiderable – 
capabilities and highly sophisticated military expertise in support of missions such as the 
enhanced Forward Presence to bolster the stability and security of a region that remains 
essential to Canada’s national interests. Ottawa will remain engaged in European 
securityif two conditions are met. First, as long as the threat persists and, second, as long 
as the transatlantic Alliance, with its frequent internal disagreements notwithstanding, 
remains ultimately united in its determination to provide collective security for all its 
members. This unique combination of flexibility and unity has sustained transatlantic 
relations and Canada’s commitment and ability to contribute to European security 
whenever and wherever there has been a risk. 
Conclusion 
Canada’s investment into PESCO comes at a risk. Or, rather, Canada’s investment is 
precisely an effort to manage that risk. Like the US and other NATO member states, 
Canada has a long-standing interest in the European Union (and its member states) as a 
more cohesive and capable defence actor, albeit not autarkic. Canada also wants to 
ensure that European defence remains rooted, first and foremost, in NATO, with the EU 
contributing to and complementing NATO objectives, rather than consolidating as a 
competing collective defence actor. The latter eventuality would leave Canada orphaned 
strategically. Canada is a member of NATO but not of the EU, and its main leverage is 
through NATO (Haglund, 1990). Nonetheless, Canadian participation in the EDF and 
PESCO is a way of buying at least some leverage with the EU as well, however limited it 
is by virtue of Canada’s being an outsider to the EU. Participation in PESCO is a way to 
contain an autarkic conception of “strategic autonomy” that may compete with NATO 
and instead drive a transatlantic conception of “strategic autonomy” that remains solidly 
rooted in NATO (Duke, 2019, p.135). 
At the same time, PESCO allows Canada to hedge against uncertainties in the 
transatlantic relationship in terms of the US commitment to NATO, collective defence 
and the defence of Europe. Canada is capitalizing on broader European interest in 
defence multilateralism beyond a hub-and-spokes approach to transatlantic security that 
hinges on Washington. It is also making every effort to ensure that the result is not a 
competing hub-and-spokes European defence network that hinges on Brussels under 
disproportionate French influence in the context of a looming Brexit and political and 
strategic weaknesses in Germany and Italy. Instead, Canada prefers a multiplayer 
transatlantic and trans-European network to which it is indispensable: a network that 
reinforces NATO as the primary transatlantic and trans-European collective defence 
actor and a network that Canada can leverage. 
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Third-party participation in PESCO is thus about much more than reaping benefits from 
defence innovations and economies of scale from defence procurement for a country that 
is a relative laggard on NATO defence spending. This is a profoundly strategic issue: for 
Canada and for the EU alike. That is precisely why third-country participation is so 
contentious. It also explains why the French are particularly sensitive about third-
country participation while Germany, the Baltics and the Nordic countries are strongly 
supportive. Germany in particular was a long-time beneficiary of stability owing to the 
Canadian military contributions and commitments during the Cold War. The Baltics in 
general, and Latvia in particular, are now benefitting from Canadian contributions and 
commitments in a similar fashion (Leuprecht et al., 2019, p. 119). 
Interestingly, Germany is the only continental European country that is also a 
Framework Nation in the enhanced Forward Presence (to Lithuania); as such, Germany 
appears to have learned a key lesson from Canada on collective defence. Only three of 
five Nordic countries are NATO members. Nevertheless, all of them are supportive of the 
third-country participation in PESCO. Arguably, Sweden and Finland understand the 
risk of not being a member of NATO and thus want to optimize the benefits of non-EU, 
NATO states member contribution to European defence. To this effect, they have already 
initiated greater regionalization of Nordic defence cooperation (Forsberg, 2013, 1165). 
That is, the three Nordic NATO member states support and see the benefits of 
cooperation with non-NATO member states with which they share regional interests. 
After all, all five Nordics have vast experience working closely with Canada, since they 
maintain collaborative relations with Canada in complementary areas such as the Arctic. 
Finally, the US, may see PESCO as some competition for their own defence innovation 
and industry at best, and at worst as draining scarce European resources from being 
invested in the US whilst being patriated to defence innovation across Europe instead. 
Yet, this gives one more strategic reason for Canadian involvement. The US knows that 
Canada’s collective defence priorities are vested in NATO, yet everyone stands to benefit 
from a more coherent and cohesive EU defence actor that can support and complement 
NATO. With the UK set to leave the EU, NATO and EU member states alike have an 
overarching interest in minimizing the disruption to transatlantic and trans-European 
security. Prospective third-country participation in PESCO is a ready means to contain 
and mitigate possible fallout for collective defence. 
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Appendix A: An overview of PESCO projects (European Union, 
2018) 
Description Project Participating States 
Training, 
Facilities 
European Union Training 
Mission Competence Centre 
(EU TMCC) 
Germany, Austria, Czechia, France, Italy, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, 
Sweden, Spain 
European Training Certification 
Centre for European Armies 
Italy, Greece 
Helicopter Hot and High 
Training (H3 Training) 
Greece, Italy, Romania 
Joint EU Intelligence School Greece, Cyprus 




Deployable Military Disaster 
Relief Capability Package 
Italy, Austria, Croatia, Greece, Spain 
Armoured Infantry Fighting Italy, Greece, Slovakia 
Indirect Fire Support 
(EuroArtillery) 
Slovakia, Hungary, Italy 
EUFOR Crisis Response 
Operation Core (EUFOR CROC) 
EUFOR Crisis Response 
Integrated Unmanned Ground 
System (UGS) 
Estonia, Belgium, Czechia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain 
EU Beyond Line Of Sight 
(BLOS) Land Battlefield Missile 
Systems 
France, Belgium, Cyprus 
Maritime Maritime (semi-) Autonomous 
Systems for Mine 
Countermeasures (MAS MCM) 
Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania 
Harbour & Maritime 
Surveillance and Protection 
(HARMSPRO) 
Italy, Greece, Poland, Portugal 
Upgrade of Maritime 
Surveillance 




Capability Package (DIVEPACK) 
Bulgaria, France, Greece 
Air, Systems European Medium Altitude 
Long Endurance Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft Systems – 
MALE RPAS (Eurodrone) 
Germany, Czechia, France, Italy, Spain 
European Attack Helicopters 
TIGER Mark III 
France, Germany, Spain 
Counter Unmanned Aerial 
System (C-UAS) 
Italy, Czechia 
Cyber, C4ISR European Secure Software 
defined Radio (ESSOR) 
France, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain 
Cyber Threats and Incident 
Response Information Sharing 
Platform 
Greece, Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain 
Cyber Rapid Response Teams 
and Mutual Assistance in Cyber 
Security 
Lithuania, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania 
Strategic Command and Control 
(C2) System for CSDP Missions 
and Operations 





European High Atmosphere 
Airship Platform (EHAAP) – 
Persistent Intelligence, 
Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability 
Italy, France 
One Deployable Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) 
Tactical Command and Control 
(C2) Command Post (CP) for 
Small Joint Operations (SJO) – 
(SOCC) for SJO 
Greece, Cyprus 
Electronic Warfare Capability 
and Interoperability Programme 







European Medical Command Germany, Belgium, Czechia, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden 
Network of logistic Hubs in 
Europe and support to 
Operations 
Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain 
Military Mobility Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czechia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden 
Energy Operational Function 
(EOF) 
France, Belgium, Italy, Spain 
Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear 
(CBRN) Surveillance as a 
Service (CBRN SaaS) 
Austria, Croatia, France, Hungary, Slovenia 
Co-basing France, Belgium, Czechia, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain 
Geospacial, Meteorological and 
Oceanographic (GeoMETOC) 
Support Coordination Element 
(GMSCE) 
Germany, Austria, France, Greece, Portugal, 
Romania 
Space EU Radio Navigation Solution 
(EURAS) 
France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland, 
Spain 
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Appendix B: An overview of PESCO projects added as of November 
2019 European Union, 2019) 
Description Project Participating States 
Training, 
Facilities 
Integrated European Joint Training and 
simulation Centre (EUROSIM) 
Hungary, France, 
Germany, Poland, Slovenia 
EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub Portugal, Spain 
Special Operations Forces Medical Training 
Centre (SMTC) 
Poland, Hungary 
CBRN Defence Training Range (CBRNDTR) Romania, France, Italy 
European Union Network of Diving Centres 
(EUNDC) 
Romania, Bulgaria, France 
Maritime Maritime Unmanned AntiSubmarine System 
(MUSAS) 
Portugal, France, Spain, 
Sweden 
European Patrol Corvette (EPC) Italy, France 
Air, Systems Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) Spain, France, Sweden 









Timely Warning and Interception with Space-
based TheatER surveillance (TWISTER) 
France, Finland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain 
Materials and components for technological 
EU competitiveness (MAC-EU) 
France, Portugal, Romania, 
Spain 
EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities 
(ECoWAR) 
France, Belgium, Hungary, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden 
European Global RPAS Insertion Architecture 
System 
Italy, France, Romania 
 
 
